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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) networks are becoming a
part of our daily lives and the number of IoT devices around us
are surging. The authentication of millions of connected things
and the distribution and management of shared keys between
these devices pose challenging research problems. Current one-
to-one authentication schemes do not take the resource limitations
of IoT devices into consideration. Nor do they address the
scalability problem of massive machine type communication
(mMTC) networks. Group authentication schemes (GAS), on
the other hand, have emerged as novel approaches for many-to-
many authentication problems. They can be used to simultane-
ously authenticate many resource-constrained devices. However,
existing group authentication schemes are not energy efficient,
and they do not provide enough security for widespread use.
In this paper, we propose a lightweight GAS that significantly
reduces energy consumption on devices, providing almost 80%
energy savings compared to the state-of-the-art solutions. Our
approach is resistant to the common replay and man-in-the-
middle attacks.. The proposed approach also includes a solution
for key agreement and distribution in mMTC environments.
Moreover, this approach can be used in both centralized and
decentralized group authentication scenarios.
Index Terms—Group authentication, Internet of Things, mas-
sive machine type communication, secret sharing scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
A thing in an Internet of Things (IoT) network can be
defined as a physical or virtual node which connects to
the Internet and has the ability to communicate with other
nodes [1], [2]. Security and privacy are crucial points in the
advancement of IoT networks. The IoT paradigm extends the
capabilities of the Internet to mobile and sensor networks.
Each node is connected to the network and is also capable
of communicating with each other. The confidentiality and
integrity of data and the authentication of nodes are the
main security issues for IoT networks [3]. Authenticating each
node remains a key challenge. Authentication is a process for
ascertaining that an entity really is who it claims to be [4]. It
is one of the most important processes in the access control
chain, since all other security and data transmission operations
follow after the authentication process.
There will be numerous connected nodes around us in the
near future which are connected to us and/or to each other.
Most of them have limited computing power and battery ca-
pacity. Therefore, the use of traditional cryptographic methods
is not possible for the authentication process of resource-
constrained IoT nodes. IoT networks typically have a three-
layer design, comprised of a sensing layer, a network layer,
and an application layer. The sensing layer consists of IoT
nodes with various sensing capabilities. The network layer
Fig. 1. Three-layer Internet of Things (IoT) architecture. The data is collected
through the sensing layer and transferred over the network layer to servers
and databases in the application layer. Users connect to the system over the
cloud.
aids transmission of the sensed data to the servers. Typically,
gateways are used as the devices that provide the connec-
tion between the application layer and sensing layer, along
with routers and other packet forwarding devices. Traditional
authentication methods can be used in gateways since these
devices have relatively high computational power. On the other
hand, lightweight authentication solutions are needed for the
sensing layer nodes.
In traditional authentication methods, the client and authen-
tication server usually have the shared key before communica-
tion. A random value, which is selected and sent by the server
to the client, is encrypted by the client with the shared key,
and the encrypted value is sent back to the server. Finally, the
server validates the client by decrypting the response. In this
process, there is one claimer and one prover. The prover can
only authenticate one user at a time. So this approach is not
scalable for densely deployed IoT networks where millions of
nodes are expected to be operational. Although the problem
of providing connectivity to all these nodes is currently being
addressed by 3GPP in Release 16 under the name massive
machine-type communications (mMTC), the scalability of the
authentication process remains to be addressed.
According to IMT-2020’s mMTC requirements, over 1
million nodes can operate in a single km2 [5]. Although the
security issues of mMTC networks are visible and currently
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2being studied by the research community [6], to the best of the
authors’ knowledge there are no standardization efforts target-
ing the scalability of device authentication in these networks
[7]. Each mMTC node must perform individual authentication
with an authentication server according to the current evolved
packet system authentication protocol (EPS-AKA) in mobile
networks [8]. This can cause high signaling overhead on the
server. One of the bottlenecks in this scenario is that all IoT
nodes can request authentication from the server at the same
time, and the server cannot respond to all the requests. A fast
authentication proposal is required to authenticate all users at
the same time.
Group authentication is one of the best solutions to mini-
mize the load on the authentication server. Millions of nodes
in IoT can create groups according to their coverage area or
functions in the system. Instead of sending all authentication
requests to the server, authentication within the group will
reduce the load of the server. The many-to-many group au-
thentication idea was proposed by Harn in [9] and developed
further by Chien in [10].
Existing group authentication approaches do not take the
resource constraints of the network into account. However,
sensing nodes in an IoT environment frequently have limited
memory, tight energy constraints, and very limited processing
capability. So during the authentication process, the commu-
nication overhead on the nodes should be as little as pos-
sible. Also, the energy consumption of group authentication
algorithm should be as low as possible. For this reason,
traditional cryptographic systems, along with existing group
authentication methods, are not proper for IoT and lightweight
systems must be proposed.
Group authentication in wireless communication environ-
ments is more vulnerable to attacks by unauthorized entities.
Man-in-the-middle attacks can be performed by anyone who
can capture group credentials. Hence, group authentication al-
gorithms must provide security for attacks on wireless channel.
Existing group authentication approaches remain vulnerable to
such attacks.
Another challenge for IoT networks is the need for secure
communication between nodes without any human interven-
tion. For secure communication between millions of mMTC
nodes, each node must have a shared key. In such a crowded
environment, key distribution and management consume too
much time and energy.
In light of these challenges, our main contributions are as
listed:
• We propose a flexible lightweight authentication scheme
to overcome the possible problems in group authentica-
tion and that can be used in centralized or decentralized
group authentication scenarios. Group members share
their private keys publicly in other group authentication
schemes. If an intruder can eavesdrop on group traffic,
the intruder can recover the group secret.
• Our proposed approach offers a group key for mMTC. At
the end of the group authentication, each group member
can recover the same group key for further communica-
tions. The mMTC nodes communicate with each other
by symmetric key encryption once they have a group
key. In terms of privacy and security, the private keys
are not used for group authentication, which secures the
privacy of group members and prevents intruders from
capturing private keys and performing man-in-the-middle,
impersonation or replay attack.
• Lightweight schemes are vital for IoT scenarios due to
the resource constrained nodes. When we compare our
proposal with other group authentication schemes, the
energy consumption of one node can be reduced by 80%.
Additionally, the energy consumption remains constant
even if the number of group members increases.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides an overview of security requirements for IoT and an
overview of existing group authentication methods. In Section
III, our proposed approach for group authentication is pre-
sented. The security and performance evaluation is provided
in Section IV and Section V, respectively. Conclusions are pre-
sented in Section VI. The study is completed by an overview
of future work suggestions in Section VII.
II. RELATED BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW
There are three layers in IoT architecture as shown in Figure
1. As the first layer, the sensing layer provides information
from the field to the upper layers. The components in this
layer include sensors of diverse applications or radio frequency
identification (RFID) tags and readers [3]. The network layer
is the mediator between the sensing and application layers
and is responsible for the secure transmission of information
from the former to the latter. This network layer mostly relies
on traditional networks such as the Internet, mobile commu-
nication networks, satellite networks, or wireless networks
[3]. The application layer, for its part, provides services to
users. Each layer must have different security requirements
according to the capabilities of the layer components. Our
proposed approach focuses mostly on the sensing layer due
to the computational restrictions on IoT nodes. We propose a
lightweight scheme to provide authentication and key agree-
ment for nodes in the sensing layer. Our proposed approach is
based on the group authentication technique used to combat
scalability problems that arise as the number of components
in IoT networks increases.
Studies on group authentication have mostly focused on
secret sharing schemes. In general, a group key is divided
into a number of shares via a secret sharing algorithm that
distributes private keys among users. Users share their private
keys with each other, and each user can recover the group
key after by using their private keys up to a threshold value.
Finally, group users can communicate with each other securely
by a symmetric key encryption.
Harn proposed a group authentication method based on
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme (SSS) [9]. According to
Shamir [11], a secret value D is divided into n pieces and the
secret can be recovered by having k pieces. However, even if
one owns k − 1 shares, the secret can not be recovered. The
scheme is called (k,n) threshold scheme. Drawing on SSS,
Harn proposed three group authentication schemes: one basic
scheme and two asynchronous schemes. In the basic scheme,
3the group manager (GM), the most powerful member of the
group with the most resource capabilities, selects a polynomial
f(x) of degree k−1, f(x) = a0+a1x+a2x2+. . .+ak−1xk−1.
The first coefficient a0 is the group key. The GM computes
one private key f(xi) and one public key xi for each user
Ui. Then, the GM shares private keys with related users. In
the group authentication phase, each user shares their private
key with other users. After having t ≥ k private keys, each
user can compute the group key by the Lagrange interpolating
formula:
a0 =
t∑
i=1
f(xi)
t∏
r=1,r 6=i
−xr
xi − xr . (1)
The basic algorithm is secure if the users share their private
keys simultaneously. Otherwise any attacker can capture k
private keys and recover the polynomial. Then, the attacker
also can share a valid private key. Due to the vulnerabilities
of the basic scheme, Harn proposed two asynchronous group
authentication schemes.
The first of the asynchronous authentication schemes, given
in [9], is for one-time authentication. In the preparation phase,
the GM selects t values such that kt > n − 1 and selects
random polynomials, fl(x), l = 1, 2, . . . , t, having degree k−
1. The GM generates tokens, fl(xi), l = 1, 2, . . . , t, for each
group member Ui. The GM then finds the integers wj , dj , j =
1, 2, . . . , t, such that the secret key, s, is
s =
t∑
j=1
djf(wj) (2)
for every pair of i and j. The GM makes these integers
wj , dj , j = 1, 2, . . . , k, and H(s) publicly known where H(·)
is a cryptographic hash function. In the group authentication
phase, each user Ui uses its tokens and computes
ci =
k∑
j=1
djfj(xi)
m∏
r=1,r 6=i
wj − xr
xi − xr , (3)
and shares the computed value with other group members. Af-
ter having, cr, r = 1, 2, . . . ,m, each group member computes
s′ =
m∑
r=1
cr. (4)
If H(s′) is equal to H(s), all users will have been authenti-
cated. Outside attackers cannot derive any private token from
the released ci value. Therefore, the approach provides security
for asynchronous group authentication. However, it is a one-
time authentication since the secret is no longer a secret once
it has been recovered [9].
The second asynchronous authentication scheme was de-
signed for multiple authentications. In this case, the GM
selects two large prime numbers, p and q, such that q divides
p − 1, and selects gi which is a generator of GF (q). Next,
the GM selects two polynomials, fl(x), l = 1, 2, having
t − 1 degree, and generates tokens fl(xi), l = 1, 2, for each
group member Ui. There are multiple secrets selected by the
GM. For each secret, the GM then selects random integers,
wi,j , di,j , j = 1, 2, and computes secrets
si = g
∑2
j=1 di,jfj(wi,j)
i . (5)
The GM makes these integers wi,j , di,j and gi, H(si) publicly
known. In the group authentication phase, each user Ui uses
their tokens and computes
ci =
2∑
j=1
di,jfj(xi)
m∏
r=1,r 6=i
wi,j − xr
xi − xr , (6)
and then computes ei = gcii shares the computed ei value with
other group members. After having, ei, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, each
group member computes
s′i =
m∏
i=1
ei. (7)
If H(s′i) is equal to H(si), all users will have been authenti-
cated. According to the security analysis by Harn, it is infea-
sible to recover ci value from ei due to the discrete logarithm
problem. In other words, private user tokens are protected from
released values. Also, even if an attacker obtains the secret si,
it is infeasible to recover
∑2
j=1 di,jfj(wi,j) values because of
the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). To put it differently,
private user tokens are protected [9].
Chien [10] has shown that the Harn asynchronous schemes
have some critical weaknesses. If an attacker can get k distinct
values in k different trials, the secret function chosen by the
GM can be solved and all users’ secrets can be obtained.
It is proved in [10] with simple examples that an attacker
can recover group secret values and user private tokens.
Chien introduced a new method based on SSS, elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) and pairing-based cryptography in order
to ensure a secure group authentication process with multiple
trials and multiple authentications. In this new method, ac-
cording to Chien, the GM selects two additive groups G1 and
G2, and one multiplicative group G3 with order q. The GM
makes a generator P for G2 public. A polynomial with degree
t− 1 is chosen. The constant term of the polynomial will be
the master secret s. The value of
Q = s× P in G2 (8)
is then computed and shared publicly. For each user, one
public key xi and one private key f(xi) are chosen and
shared with the related users secretly. Users participating in
the authentication phase agree on a random point Rv in G1.
Then, each user computes
ci = f(xi)
m∏
r=1,r 6=i
−xr
xi − xr , (9)
and releases ci Rv . After all users release the ci× Rv , each
user computes
m∑
i=1
ci ×Rv, (10)
and verifies whether
e
(
m∑
i=1
ci ×Rv, P
)
?
=e(Rv, Q) (11)
holds. In Chien’s approach, group members can authenticate
each other, but they can not recover the group key for further
4communications. Extra steps are required in order to obtain
the group secret value by each group member. According to
the security analysis by Chien, the private tokens are protected
due to the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
Accordingly, it is infeasible to obtain ci values from ciRv
as long as ECDLP is hard. In addition, for a valid ciRv
and another point R2, one cannot compute ciR2 as long as
the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDHP) is hard.
The last point in the security analysis for Chien’s proposed
approach is a bilinear pairing inversion problem(BPIP). Given
the values e(Rv, Q) and Q one cannot derive the value∑m
i=1 ci × Rv as long as BPIP is hard. If ECDLP, BPIP or
ECDHP is not hard, any attacker can compute a valid value
and participate in the group authentication.
In addition to the group authentication schemes described
above, several studies have been proposed in order to reduce
the computation and communication costs [12]–[14]. However,
these approaches do not provide many-to-many authentication,
i.e., the GM can not authenticate group members at the same
time.
An authentication method is proposed in [12] for MTC to
authenticate user equipments (UE) through the gateway as
quick as possible. The gateway communicates with UEs one
by one to have the tokens of UEs. The gateway authenticates
UEs as a group via a home subscriber server. One-to-one
communication between UEs and gateway causes additional
communicational cost.
Asmuth and Bloom proposed a key safeguarding scheme,
which is based on the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) in
[13]. If anyone has shadows up to r, the secret value y can
be computed easily using CRT. But anyone who has r − 1
shadows can not know the secret [13].
The authors proposed an algorithm using Paillier threshold
cryptography in [14]. They compared their results with Harn’s
group authentication method and presented the results from
their experiments. The results from [14] show that their
algorithm has a better computational time than Harn’s group
authentication algorithm. But they did not take into account
the computational cost of public and private key encryptions
or scalability issues.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD
A. Preliminaries
In the proposed algorithm, a group authentication process is
performed first, after which group members recover group keys
for further communication. Group authentication is crucial for
the scalability of the system components and the resource
usage of the group members. The group key agreement part
of the algorithm is to provide machine-to-machine communi-
cation without the need of central authority.
We begin by introducing computationally hard problems,
which are used by Harn and Chien, and compare them with
our proposed approach.
Definition 1. The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
is defined as [10]: given an elliptic curve over a finite field Fp
and two points P,Q over an elliptic curve, to find a integer k
such that Q = kP is ECDLP.
Fig. 2. Group authentication use-case example. A cloud-based IoT network
with different groups is shown. Each gateway acts as the group manager.
Definition 2. The computational elliptic curve Diffie-
Hellman problem is [10]: given an elliptic curve over a finite
field Fp, a point P over an elliptic curve and points A = aP ,
B = bP , to find a point C = abP is the computational
ECDHP.
Definition 3. The bilinear pairing inversion problem is
defined as [10]: Given e(P,Q) and a point Q to find the point
P is the BPIP.
B. A Use-Case Example: Authentication Scenarios of Cloud-
Based IoT
Before giving the details of our proposed approach, we
provide an example of a scenario where our scheme could
be used. Cloud-based IoT technology consists of three com-
ponents: the cloud network, IoT gateways and IoT sensors.
Each IoT sensor is the sensing node of the system. It provides
real-time information from the field. The gateway is the
contact point of the sensing layer with traditional networks.
It transmits the information to the cloud through the Internet
or a mobile network.
Authentication is one of the most crucial steps in cloud-
based IoT technology. Each component must authenticate
others before transmitting any information. The cloud must
authenticate the gateways, and the gateways must authenticate
the sensors as well. If the number of sensors is too high in
an IoT network, a group authentication scheme is vital. As
shown in Figure 2, each gateway with its sensors creates a
group. The critical point here is that the gateway has a higher
computational capability than sensors. The gateway should be
the group manager and perform group authentication before
data transmission.
In a smart home or smart medical system, the sensors or
machines can share data with each other. Therefore, a key
agreement scheme is required to ensure the confidentiality
of the data. Below, we propose a key agreement scheme
5after group authentication is completed. As illustrated by the
scenario, a central authority is needed for group authentication.
But if we assume that sensors will create a group without a
gateway, there may not be a central authority. The appropriate
selection of the group manager in this scenario becomes
essential from the authentication perspective. For such an ad-
hoc scenario, below we also propose group authentication
without a group manager. Two options are noted at each step
of our proposal. Hence, we provide a flexible and lightweight
group authentication scheme that also scales with the number
of increasing sensor nodes.
C. The Proposed Method
The GM is assumed to be infrastructure-based and has
relatively more computational power. In addition to the GM,
each group has several other members with resource or compu-
tational constraints. Note that in IoT environments, the GM is
basically the gateway with specific capabilities. Sensor nodes
or RFID tags can be considered to be the other members in a
group. The capabilities of these nodes are at a certain restricted
rate.
The proposed method has two stages. The first stage in-
volves the authentication process, which is based on ECC
and SSS. This first stage consists of two phases, which are
called the initialization and confirmation phases. The second
stage, which is the key agreement stage, provides a solution to
construct a master key for further communications. The details
of each phase are presented at below.
The Initialization Phase
1) GM selects a cyclic group G and a generator P for G.
2) GM selects E = Encryption(·) and D =
Decryption(·) algorithms and a hashing function H(·).
3) A polynomial with degree t − 1 is chosen by GM and
the constant term is determined as master key s.
4) GM selects one public key xi and one private key f(xi)
for each user in the group U where each user is denoted
by Ui for i = 1, . . . , n.
5) GM computes Q = s× P .
6) GM makes P,Q,E,D,H(s), H(·), xi public and shares
f(xi) with only user Ui for i = 1, . . . , n.
The confirmation phase is executed after the GM shares the
values with the related users. There are two different options
in the confirmation phase. One is that the GM is responsible
for confirming the group members (the centralized approach).
The other is that any member in the group is responsible for
confirming the other members (the decentralized approach).
The member selection can be done on the basis of the
instantaneous resource availability of each node, such as their
battery levels.
The Confirmation Phase
1) Each user computes f(xi)×P and sends f(xi)×P |IDi
to the GM and other users (IDi is the identification
number of the user and ‖ symbol shows the concatenation
of two values).
Algorithm 1: Confirmation Phase
1 Each member computes f(xi)× P , and shares
f(xi)× P‖IDi with GM and other members
2 if GM verifies the authentication then
3 GM computes f(xi)× P for each user.
4 if All values are valid then
5 Print ‘Authentication is complete.’
6 else
7 Repeat.
8 else
9 User computes ci=f(xi)× P
m∏
r=1,r 6=i
(−xr/(xi − xr))
for each user.
10 if
m∑
i=1
ci is equal to Q then
11 Print ‘Authentication is complete’.
12 else
13 Repeat.
2) If the GM verifies the authentication, the GM computes
f(xi)× P for each user and verifies whether the values
are valid or not.
3) If the GM is not included in the verification process, any
user in the group computes
Ci =
 m∏
r=1,r 6=i
−xr
xi − xr )
 f(xi)× P (12)
for each user (m denotes the number of the users in the
group and m must be equal or larger than t).
4) User verifies whether
m∑
i=1
Ci
?
=Q (13)
holds.
5) If it holds, authentication is done. Otherwise, the process
will be repeated from the initialization phase.
Both authentication by the GM and by any group member is
given in the Algorithm 1. It is clear that group members should
only compute one elliptic curve multiplication operation. The
users should send their identification numbers by concatenat-
ing with public shares in order to avoid confusion for further
communications. This is because these public shares will be
used by other users in further communications and in the group
key agreement stage, and all members should know which
public share belongs to which user.
After the authentication has been performed, users will com-
municate with each other by using symmetric key encryption.
Shared key for symmetric key encryption will be calculated
by senders and receivers.
6Algorithm 2: The Group Key Agreement Stage
1 Ui computes E(f(xi)f(xj)P )[f(xi)] for each Uj .
2 Each user computes D(f(xj),f(xi)P )[f(xi)].
3 Each user computes
s′ =
m∑
i=1
f(xi)
m∏
r=1,r 6=i
−xr
xi − xr . (14)
4 Each user computes H(s′).
5 if H(s′) is equal to H(s) then
6 Print ‘Master Key is recovered’.
7 else
8 Repeat.
ECC is used in order to compute shared key between the
group members. Let us set the key, K as
K = (yiyjP ) (15)
where yt = f(xt), i.e., yt is the secret of the user Ut. The
sender will use their own private key (yi) and the value sent
by receiver (yjP ). The receiver will obtain the same key with
a similar operation, i.e., combining its own key yj with the
received data yiP .
After this stage, group members can communicate with each
other by a symmetric key encryption method. However, instead
of using different keys for each user, the master key that was
selected by the GM can be used as the group key. The problem
is how the users will recover the master key. We basically
exploit SSS and a symmetric key encryption method to share
the master key in the group key agreement stage.
The Group Key Agreement Stage
1) Each user shares their own secret key f(xi) with other
users using symmetric key encryption.
2) Each user decrypts the values and obtains m different
f(xi).
3) Each user computes
s′ =
m∑
i=1
f(xi)
m∏
r=1,r 6=i
−xr
xi − xr . (16)
4) Each user verifies whether
H(s′) ?=H(s) holds. (17)
At the end of the group key agreement stage, each member
within the group will recover the master key as given in
the Algorithm 2. After the group key agreement process, the
members of the group will be able to communicate with each
other using the master key. In addition, the GM can update xi
and f(xi) values remotely using the master key in order to
avoid replay attacks.
To sum up the foregoing, we propose a comprehensive
solution for the authentication of users users belonging to
the same group. A group authentication is accomplished with
very low computational power on users in the first stage. A
master key is recovered by all group users for a distributed
environment in the second stage. The details of the security
and performance analyses are given in the following parts.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze possible attacks to the presented
algorithms above. Our proposal provides security for most
man-in-the-middle and replay attacks as shown below.
Theorem 1: Group authentication cannot be performed
without t valid public and private values.
Proof. Since the stated polynomial f(x) is of degree t− 1,
it is necessary to know t distinct pairs of (x,f(x)) for the
formation of the polynomial again. f(x) cannot be constructed
by holding less than t pairs.
Theorem 2: The attacker who captures the value of Q and
P sent by the group manager publicly cannot have knowledge
of secret s.
Proof. Given two points P and Q on an elliptic curve group,
it is hard to find the s value that provides the relationship
Q = s × P . This open problem is called ECDLP. Therefore,
it is hard to find s by having Q and P .
Theorem 3: The attacker who captures the value of f(xi)P
sent by the group members to the GM cannot have knowledge
of f(xi).
Proof. Due to the hardness assumption of ECDLP, it is hard
to find f(xi) by having f(xi)P .
Theorem 4: The attacker can capture f(xi)P and f(xj)P
but can not obtain a valid symmetric key in order to establish
a communication with user Ui.
Proof. The attacker will need f(xj) to compute
f(xj)f(xi)P but f(xj) is a secret known only by the user
Uj . In other words, the attacker should be able to solve the
computational ECDHP.
Theorem 5: The attacker can not perform replay and man-
in-the-middle attack.
Proof. An attacker can eavesdrop or cut the traffic between
the GM and any user and capture f(xi)P . After having
f(xi)P , the attacker can be part of the authentication process.
Because the attacker does not have any valid f(xi), the
attacker can not communicate with any other group member
by using symmetric key encryption after the authentication
process.
Below we also list the vulnerabilities associated with the
proposed approach.
Vulnerability 1: The attacker can perform denial of service
(DoS) attacks for the authentication process.
Proof. An attacker can share a non-valid value when the
members send their shares to the GM who will confirm the
authentication. The GM can not compute the group secret
value and repeat the process. An attacker can share the non-
valid value again and perform denial of authentication.
Vulnerability 2: The node compromise attack can be per-
formed.
7Proof. If the attacker could physically capture a group
member then the attacker might obtain the secret key of the
member. As a result of capturing the secret key, the attacker
can generate a valid public key and share it with the GM in
order to authenticate itself. If the attacker has a secret key, the
attacker can also communicate with the other members of the
group by producing symmetric keys.
Vulnerability 3: The group members can perform DoS
attacks for confirmation point.
Proof. If the group members send their shares to the confir-
mation point at the same time, this certain point can be locked.
The solution for this kind of DoS attack is still a challenge in
group authentication research.
The joint design of group authentication with an authen-
tication handoff between different groups is also crucial for
an environment with millions of nodes. The groups exchange
several nodes between each other. Repeating the group au-
thentication process for each new node is resource and time
consuming. One of our future works will cover the design of a
handoff scheme in mMTC or cellular environments, as noted
in Section VII.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Group authentication is a novel method to increase the
performance of the authentication system and to decrease the
computational load on the group members. Additionally, the
number of communications between a GM and group members
is kept to a minimum in in group authentication.
The first parameter we used to compare the performance
was the communication overhead. In battery constrained wire-
less environments, the communication between users should
be as minimal as possible. In both Harn’s and Chien’s propos-
als, the users send a computed value to m−1 users (m denote
the number of users in the group). If we assume the cost of
a communication between two group users is σ, (m − 1)σ
communications are performed by one group member in both
of the proposals in order to complete the group authentication
process. In our framework, one user sends the computed value
to m− 1 users as shown in Table I.
TABLE I
COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD OF ONE USER
Harn [9] Chien [10] Proposal
(m− 1)σ (m− 1)σ (m− 1)σ
The second parameter we used to compare the performance
was the energy used by one user for group authentication.
We used the time complexity approach in [10] to com-
pare the computational complexity of our algorithm with the
schemes of Harn and Chien’s. In our algorithm, as well
as in those of Harn and Chien, the GM is responsible for
initializing the authentication. We only took into consideration
the computations that were made by group members which
were resource-restricted. While each user in Chien’s algorithm
should compute (7m + 6785)Tmul,q [10], each user in Harn
asynchronous multiple authentication scheme should compute
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Fig. 3. Comparison of computational costs (Tmul,q) of the investigated
approaches in the authentication stage.
(45m + 1418)Tmul,q [10]. Tmul,q is the time for one multi-
plication in field Fq where q is 160 bits, m is the number of
user in the group.
In our proposed approach, the group members should only
compute one elliptic curve point multiplication (TEM ). Ac-
cording to Chien [10], TEM is roughly equal to 29Tmul,p
(Tmul,p denotes the time for one multiplication in field p
where p is 1024 bits). The security of ECC with 160-bit key
is roughly equivalent to that of RSA with 1024-bit key or D-
H algorithm with 1024-bit key. Therefore; Tmul,p is roughly
equal to 41Tmul,q [10]. In our authentication algorithm, group
members compute 29Tmul,p, which is 1189(29× 41)Tmul,q .
Confirmation of the authentication process was done by
group members in Chien and Harn schemes. However in
our scheme, the GM or only one user is responsible for the
confirmation part of the authentication. As shown in Figure 3,
our proposed approach is scalable with the number of group
members.
If we assume Tmul,q is equal to 1 second and P , which is
the maximum power that an IoT node can consume, is equal
to 1 Watt, the energy consumption of one user in a group with
100 members is shown in Table II.
TABLE II
ENERGY CONSUMPTION OF ONE USER
Harn [9] Chien [10] Proposal
7485 joules 5918 joules 1189 joules
VI. CONCLUSION
This study has proposed a novel method for authentica-
tion of group communication in mMTC networks. Many-
to-many authentication is used for group authentication by
several studies but resource-constrained nodes were forced to
8compute more than their capacity. In the proposed method,
group members should only compute one elliptic curve point
multiplication. Secret sharing scheme and ECC are used on
the basis of the proposed algorithms. Most of the resource-
consuming work is done by the group manager or one of the
group members, not by all the group members.
Both centralized and decentralized scenarios are supported
by the proposed approach. In the centralized group authentica-
tion method, most of the resource consuming work is assigned
to the group manager. Thus, energy-constrained group mem-
bers do not need to consume a high amount of energy. In the
decentralized group authentication method, only one of the
group members, possibly with more computational capacity
or more battery capacity than others, consumes more energy.
The rest of the group members have a limited computational
load, enabling them to function in an energy-efficient manner.
In existing group authentication approaches, attack possibil-
ities still exist. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are
no proposals against replay, node compromise or DoS attacks
under the framework of secret sharing schemes. Our proposal
provides provides security against replay attacks if the GMs
update the credentials for each authentication.
VII. OPEN RESEARCH PROBLEMS
Each group in the group authentication scheme is coordi-
nated by the group manager. This architecture resembles the
cellular model, where the communication within each cell is
monitored and enabled through the base station. As nodes can
be mobile in some IoT networks, defining a handoff process
for mobile devices to be authenticated enables fast and reliable
communication, possibly with a low latency. Hence, the joint
design of group authentication with the authentication handoff
is of critical importance to accommodate a large number
of users that may also be mobile. Instead of repeating the
group authentication process from the start, the new node must
be authenticated by using a fast handoff scheme. For future
works, such handoff schemes must be designed to support
mobility in mMTC environments.
Another research problem lies in the configuration of the
base stations. Current networks make use of fixed base sta-
tions to enable authenticated communication between mobile
users. However, in next-generation (6G) wireless networks, an
ultra-agile radio access architecture with mobile base stations
(including aerial base stations) is envisioned as a solution for
coverage and/or unexpected congestion problems [15]. One of
the deployment challenges for such dynamic cell structures
will be from the authentication perspective. Although current
networks do not need the authentication of the base station, in
the presence of a mobile aerial base station, these intermediate
devices also need to be authenticated to avoid man-in-the-
middle attacks. A fast authentication scheme will be required
to provide authentication between mobile ground users and
aerial base stations and/or between the aerial base station
and the terrestrial base stations. Moreover, mutual authenti-
cation of all active aerial base stations will also be required.
Furthermore, the handoff processes all of the aforementioned
connections will need to be carefully designed. We believe
that the proposed group authentication technique can serve as
a foundation to these open research problems.
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